The Red Orchestra in Slovakia?

Matej Medvecký

The presented study looks into the fate of two residents of the Soviet military intelligence, Heinrich Fomferra (1895–1979) and Hans Schwarz (1909–1944). Both were German Communists, veterans of the Spanish Civil War and graduates of various special courses in Moscow. The Intelligence Agency of the Red Army General Staff sent them to Hungary with a task to create a network of collaborators in Central and Southern Europe, primarily focused on the arms industry in Germany and its allied countries. After their failure in Hungary, the two men decided to transfer their operations to Slovakia, where they managed to create networks composed of members of the resistance and particularly railmen. From this source, they then received information about German transports to the East and about preparations in the Third Reich to invade the USSR, which they consequently passed on to their superiors. The group was uncovered at the beginning of 1942 and the information recovered from the detainees allowed the German and Bulgarian security forces to carry out arrests also in Bulgaria. The study concludes with outlining the further fates of the people who played a more prominent role in the story.

Key words: Slovakia, World War II, State Security, intelligence, intelligence services, the USSR, Germany – the Third Reich

The first group of Soviet advisors in Prague: Taking control of and directing the Czechoslovak security apparatus, 1949–1953

Pavel Žáček

As in other Soviet Bloc countries, Soviet advisors and specialists deployed at individual ministries were the key instrument of Sovietisation of the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia. Their influence was frequently stronger than the word of ministers and other functionaries. The first advisors sent by the Ministry of State Security of the USSR (MGB) to Prague were Col. V. Makarov (Komarov) and Col. M. Lichachev, who came to oversee show trials and introduced various forms of repression into the security apparatus's methods. In 1950 they were replaced by a new group of advisors headed by Col. V. A. Boyarsky, which gradually focused on organising the Rudolf Slánský show trial. Thanks to a growing number of advisors and specialists, the Ministry of the Interior (in 1950–1953 the Ministry for National Security) became fully subordinate to MGB HQ in Moscow. The advisors succeeded in creating an atmosphere of general distrust and fear in Czechoslovakia and built up a network of collaborators, where necessary operating behind the backs of their own superiors and senior functionaries. In that way they helped create an international security apparatus run from Moscow that was able to operate independently throughout the Soviet Bloc.

Key words: Soviet advisors, State Security (StB), Ministry of State Security of the USSR (MGB), show trials, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of National Security, Sovietisation

The outline of the structure of the CPC organisation in the security apparatus, 1945–1968

Milan Bárta

The security services were one of the most important buttresses of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia's (CPC) system of power. Cooperation between them and the CPC and control of them was intended to safeguard the party organisation within the security apparatus, alongside the relevant division of the Central Committee of the CPC. The study traces the development of the organisation of the Communist Party at the Ministry of the Interior/Ministry of National Security in the period 1945–1969. Communist organisations functioned illicitly in the National Security Corps until 1948 and the following five years saw the formation and organisation of political work in the security services. This was greatly complicated by the arrest of leading security officials in the early 1950s. It wasn't until the mid 1950s that the structure of party organisations settled and leadership became more professional. In the 1960s they became consolidated and their activities formalised. In 1968 party organisations led the reform process at the Ministry of the Interior. At the start of normalisation the party structure in the security apparatus underwent major transformations in terms of organisation and personnel and the revived CPC organisation later led extensive purges at the Ministry. Until 1989 it remained a solid bulwark of the Communist Party's leadership.

Key words: Main Committee of the Communist Party at the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of the Interior, normalisation, CPC organisation, Prague Spring, State Security (StB), 1968

Cooperation between the KGB and the Interior Ministry of the PPR on so-called Vatican orientation during the papacies of John XXIII and Paul VI

Władysław Bułhak

The study sets out to map the cooperation between Eastern Bloc intelligence services in the 1960s and 1970s on what was referred to as "Vatican orientation", which Moscow considered a matter for Poland (and in part for Hungary). Therefore this "orientation" became the "specialisation" of the intelligence services of the countries in question within the framework of the communist intelligence community coordi-

nated by the USSR. The paper reconstructs Moscow's influence on the Polish intelligence service's activities and "Vatican" position. The KGB's perceptions of the Holy See and the Vatican's Eastern policy are also explored, as is a joint operation conducted by both services aimed at infiltrating the Jesuit order. It concludes with the assertion that the Holy See's "conciliatory" political line (the Vatican's "ostpolitik") was regarded by Moscow (with some justification) with suspicion, with the church and religion being perceived as a political threat to the communist system. It is no wonder, therefore, that the Soviets pushed for a deepening of cooperation and that the Poles were expected to elaborate a joint action plan against the Vatican and the Catholic Chruch. This issue became more urgent with the ascendancy of Cardinal Karol Wojtyla, John Paul II, to the Chair of St. Peter.

Key words: Poland, PPR, Vatican, Holy See, Catholic Church, Vatican Eastern policy (Ostpolitik), intelligence, Committee for State Security (KGB)

The overt and covert presence of the secret police: On the public presentation and perception of the State Security in everyday life in the GDR

Jens Gieseke

The social effectiveness of mass surveillance and control of East German (GDR) society by the Ministry for State Security (Stasi) was based on what one might call the "Stasi myth", i.e., the place that public and semi-public "appearances" of the secret, "invisible" police held in the everyday consciousness of GDR citizens. This article discusses different forms of visible presence with regard to the images associated with the work of the Stasi and their intentional or unintentional effects in social life. This includes mentions of the Ministry and its activities in the media, film and literature, public appearances such as parades and the physiognomy of its facilities in their urban environment, as well as personal encounters with secret police officers. An analysis of the party newspaper *Neues Deutschland* ("New Germany") shows that it frequently stressed the high socio-political status of the Ministry. However, in contrast to the 1950s with its propaganda for open repression, the newspaper increasingly hid concrete acts of persecution of "enemies". This public image of the Ministry thereby contributed to the welfare dictatorship model, which promised GDR citizens no threat from the State Security provided that they adhered to apolitical and adapted behaviour.

Key words: Ministry for State Security, Stasi, East Germany, GDR, propaganda, public representations, newspapers, movies, city landscapes, images

The activities of foreign intelligence services on the territory of the CSR, 1948–1950: an StB command report, January 1951 (document)

Markéta Bártová

A report drafted by State Security (StB) command dated 22 January 1951, largely on the basis of testimonies from captured couriers (cross-border agents) and their collaborators, provides a summary of the most important information that the Czechoslovak security services possessed on the activities of foreign intelligence services on Czechoslovak Republic (CSR) territory at that time. The document outlines in detail the way foreign networks were organised on CSR territory, describes the types and methods of use of what were called dead drops or other means of communication and delivers a great number of unique, painstakingly created sketches and photographs. In addition, it presents brief biographies of key figures in Czechoslovak intelligence groups abroad, including František Moravec, Rudolf Drbohlav, Jaroslav Kašpar and the brothers Alois and Ferdinand Šeda. The scope and credibility of the information demonstrates that the StB were very well informed about these activities, which involved, at various degrees of intensity, thousands of Czechoslovak citizens. The study summarises basic, though in several regards previously insufficiently known, information on the methods employed by the anti-Communist resistance in the immediate aftermath of the Communist takeover in the CSR.

Key words: State Security (StB), intelligence services, espionage, dead drop, post-1948 defection, anti-communist resistance, Czechoslovakia, CSR

For peace and socialism to the bitter end II: Documents on the co-operation between the Czechoslovak and Soviet intelligence services, 1987–1989

Pavel Žáček

Among the written documents of Czechoslovakia's Communist intelligence service that remained following shredding carried out in December 1989 are a number, dating from February 1988 and 1989, on the cooperation between the Central Directorate of the National Security Corps (I S-SNB) and the Central Directorate of the Committee for State Security (I HS-KGB) of the USSR on agency-operational work and the production of active or influence operations. The documents capture the cooperation between the two fraternal services in terms of political intelligence (drawing mainly on the Soviets' intelligence sources), concrete departments of the counterintelligence abroad (26th department), defectors and ideo-diversion (31st department) and active and influence operations (36th department). Two other documents are records of the likely final meeting between Czechoslovak intelligence service officers at the HQ of the Soviet intelligence service in late November 1989, which, surprisingly, also in-

volved their commander, Lieut. Gen. Leonid Shebarshin. Though the final form of two documents created in the second half of November 1989 is relatively brief, and some passages are evidently not a full record of proceedings, they are important and unique documents that capture the changing positions of and relationship between the two intelligence services.

Key words: intelligence service, intelligence cooperation, State Security (StB), Committee for State Security (KGB), agency-operative work, active and influence measures, defection and ideodiversion