Military Intelligence from Libya and Terrorism

THE “OIL” RESIDENCY IN THE MATERIALS OF THE MAIN MILITARY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

PAVEL ŽÁČEK

On the basis of an international treaty between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, at the end of October and the beginning of November 1977, 625 Czechoslovak military experts arrived in Tripoli. Led by Brigadier General Juraj Lalo, they were meant to assist the Libyan armed forces improve their training and to improve the battle readiness of the air force, armoured forces, and artillery. The Czechoslovak “normalisation” regime had no excessive illusions about the nature of its north African partner. The only thing that perhaps united them both was their acute anti-Americanism or possibly their opposition to Israel. Besides ensuring the required inflow of foreign currencies with security forces – in a manner similar to their Soviet and East German counterparts – until the year 1989, they strived to take advantage of the relatively opportune political situation in their sphere of interest for the benefit of their power politics.

The establishment of the “Oil” residency

On 1 November 1977, by order of General Martin Dzúr, the Federal Minister of National Defence, a senior managing officer and specialist with the political department of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Czechoslovak People’s Army (ZS/GŠ ČSLA), Colonel František Sýkora, was appointed to the official post of military and aviation attaché (VLP) at the Czechoslovak consul-ar office in Libya on the basis of being named the resident for the ZS/GŠ ČSLA residency in Tripoli, with the codename “Oil” (“Ropa”).

In directives approved by the deputy head of the ZS/GŠ ČSLA for humint intelligence, Colonel Karel Sochor, the attaché was supposed to conscientiously and respectfully perform the duties of the official attaché post, but only as a cover activity that could be used as much as possible for the fulfilment of intelligence tasks. *Always be aware that the main goal of your mission abroad is the fulfilment of agency tasks ensuing from orders issued to you by head office.* In his activities, he was specifically subordinate to the 23rd Department of the ZS/GŠ ČSLA headed by Colonel Václav Hataš.

In the initial phase, the Central Head Office (Hlavní ústředí) asked Colonel Sýkora requested to ascertain the opportunities for recruitment and information 1

---

1 Security Services Archive (hereinafter only referred to as ABS), fond (i.e. a fund or collection of documents in an archive, hereinafter only referred to as f.), the Intelligence Service of the General Staff (hereinafter only referred to as ZS/GŠ), archive number (hereinafter only referred to as a. č.) 38869. Personal file 589, 1. section. Re: An informational report on the receipt of Czechoslovak military experts in Libya, 3 November 1977, č. j. (i.e. Ref. No) 01/1977.

2 Colonel František Sýkora, born: 29 January 1925, joined the ZS/GŠ ČSLA as a political worker on 25 September 1957. In the years 1960-1962 he completed studies at the Zpravodajský institut (Intelligence Institute), from 8 October 1963 to 9 October 1967 he was VLP at the Czechoslovak embassy in Egypt, in the years 1967-1969, he was a senior officer of the third group of the department (3/2nd department) of strategic intelligence for the management of the “Nil” (SAR – Egypt) and “Babylon” (SYAR – Syria) residencies, from 1 October 1969 to 9 September 1971 he was head of the 3/2nd division (which managed the following residencies: “Riviera,” ”Korida,” ”Magreb,” ”Duna,” “Nil,” ”Babylon,” ”Kandahár,” and ”Bambus”), from 1 December 1971 to 30 September 1976 he was VLP at the Czechoslovak embassy in the USA, in 1976-1978 he was the leading senior specialist officer for the political division of the ZS/GŠ and from 13 February 1978 to 10 November 1982 he was VLP and the R-ROPA (R-OIL) resident (589) in Tripoli under the cover of the embassy counsellor for the embassy in Libya. He was retired from the 23rd department of the ZS/GŠ ČSLA on 31 January 1983.

3 See footnote 18 for his career path.
Activites. His attention was supposed to be focused on individual groups with an emphasis on:
- the diplomatic corps with diplomats from the Arab world and developing countries being the priority,
- resistance movements and individual representatives supported by Libya,
- professional specialists working in Libya who have a relationship with the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR) either by virtue of having studied previously in the CSSR or of having a Czech wife, etc.

In the next phase, the main task was the construction of a network of agents, initially with the help of selected collaborators (SP) from the ranks of Czechoslovak military experts. Colonel Sýkora was meant to ensure that the “Oil” residency in Libya would build up a working network of agents, comprising at least on agent/source (AP), two cognisant informers (VI), and a sub-network of unwitting informers (NI). The aim of constructing a network of agents is to ensure the permanent and systematic supply of valuable reports that lead to uncovering the intentions of the imperialist powers and individual Arab states for influencing further developments in the Near East. [...] The influence of Libya on the development of inter-Arab relations is one of your most important areas of informational interest. Another objective was to obtain samples (documents) of military technology belonging to the armies of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) and French aviation technology.

Colonel Sýkora had a fundamental duty to rigorously observe the principles of conspiracy and security while creating and managing a network of agents. He was then meant to devote extraordinary attention to management activities with respect to the Lubomír Hrnčíř (organ 621), who was living there legally and was the residency’s second officer. Systematically evaluate all items of knowledge about the activities of KR [counterintelligence] against the residency, the ZU [embassy], the military mission, and against individual subjects and members of their families. Continuously adopt the necessary countermeasures to ensure the uninterrupted fulfilment of the main tasks of the residency and the security of its members. For this purpose, he was meant to maintain close cooperation with the officer (resident) of the Main Military Counterintelligence Directorate, Lieutenant Colonel Miloš Čech, who worked as an officer managing a group of Czechoslovak military experts for special tasks.

Last but not least, Colonel Sýkora was obliged to maintain the so-called ideologically political and moral unity of the residency’s officers and members of their families in the spirit of the Marxist-Leninist line of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSC), and he was also obliged to maintain close contact with other employees of the Czechoslovak consular office and members of the Soviet consulate as well as the representatives of the other Warsaw Pact states. The evaluation of Colonel Sýkora, who stayed at the foreign “Oil” residency from February to November 1982, indicates that he did not succeed in building up a network of agents. Although he began working on three potential intelligence targets (ZA) of Arab origin (TRIF, LIBU, and RIM), only one of them made it to the stage of becoming a novice cognisant informer. However, as a result of the poor quality of the information results and the incomplete uncovering of agent possibilities, the
Central Head Office did not approve taking him on. Although he built up a network of collaborators (VOK\textsuperscript{11}, DUMI\textsuperscript{12}, RADIS\textsuperscript{13}, ABDUL\textsuperscript{14}, BRUK\textsuperscript{15}, and ŠER\textsuperscript{16}), only RADIS and ABDUL developed any active activity.

After an initial befuddled phase, when the resident only obtained half the stipulated samples of Western military technology (just eight specimens), he subsequently supplied a total of five samples and three technical documents that were rated at the second highest level (Grade “4”). Later, however, his activity fell off once again – he obtained three samples of military technology (BT) and three documents of essentially average quality. As opposed to this, in the area of encryption and analytical information, he showed some very good results throughout his sojourn. In the last two training years alone (1980/81 and 1981/82), he sent a total of 120 informational ciphers, of which 20 were rated as being Grade “3.”

89 were Grade “2,” and the rest were Grade “1.” He achieved a total number of 18 analytical reports, one of which was Grade “4” and 10 were Grade “3.”\textsuperscript{17} Ahead of time on 29 June 1982, the minister of national defence appointed the hitherto head of the 23rd department of the ZS/GŠ ČSLA, Colonel Václav Hataš, as the new representative of the department in Libya.\textsuperscript{18} The relevant document from the middle of October 1982, approved by the deputy head of the directorate for humint intelligence, Colonel Jaroslav Straka, was based on the need to abide by the Czechoslovak foreign policy line, as well as the directives, tasks and instructions of the Central Head Office in regard to agent activity. By agreement with the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the resident’s official work classification at the consular office in Tripoli – embassy counsellor – was newly regulated by a special directive, which, among other things, demarcated his subordination to the ambassador in regard to social and official activity.

Otherwise, as of the day of his arrival in Tripoli on 28 October 1982, Hataš was understandably controlled by the 23rd department of the ZS/GŠ ČSLA, which was taken over by his successor Colonel Premysl Kšaš.\textsuperscript{19} The main tasks of the new resident – to monitor and evaluate the strategic interests and specific measures taken by the USA and NATO countries with respect to Libya and other Arab BV [Near East] countries – were not particularly different to those of his predecessor. As a task of particular importance, use the presence of our technical support, assess the tendency of the LOS [Libyan armed forces] to arm themselves with the technology of Western armies and, in the event of its being affirmative in this case, organise obtaining samples of progressive military technology. […] While organising this activity, be aware of the fact that if it is uncovered or possibly brought to light in this area, this could also negatively influence the national interests of the CSSR in Libya. Besides this, Colonel Hataš was given the task of monitoring Libya’s bilateral relations with the Arab Republic of Egypt and the development of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Consider building and controlling a high-quality agent network and creating an information system out of members of the Czechoslovak military specialists to be the principal, basic resource for obtaining information.\textsuperscript{20}

In view of the fact that he did not take over any agency resource from his predecessor, Colonel Hataš received a personal recruitment task: by targeting individual bases to obtain by the end of 1985 one agent/source, one cognisant informer, and two new collaborators from the ranks of Czechoslovak military experts. Maintain the principles of conspiracy in all activity. Systematically evaluate all knowledge of the activities of [Libyan] KR against the residency, the embassy and Czechoslovak military experts. Continuously inform head office and adopt countermeasures to ensure the uninterrupted fulfilment of the main tasks. To ensure this task, maintain close cooperation with the resident of the Third Directorate of the Federal Ministry of the Interior in Tripoli.\textsuperscript{21} The new resident was also fully responsible for the political and professional management of the cipherer/officer of the 50th department of the Main Counterintelligence Directorate of the National Security Corps\textsuperscript{22} and his moral and political status. Follow all events in the CSSR as well as in the entire socialist camp, with emphasis on issues

---

\textsuperscript{11} Cf. ibid., a. č. 38917.
\textsuperscript{12} Cf. ibid., a. č. 39636.
\textsuperscript{13} Cf. ibid., a. č. 39165.
\textsuperscript{14} Cf. ibid., a. č. 2855.
\textsuperscript{15} Cf. ibid., a. č. 38907.
\textsuperscript{16} Cf. ibid., a. č. 39643.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., a. č. 38869. Personal file 589, I: Re: An evaluation of the overall activity of entity 589 in the post of R-ROPA resident in Libya, 4 January 1983, č. j. 00133001/OS-30/83.
\textsuperscript{18} Colonel Václav Hataš, born: 5 October 1928, in the years 1954–1956 he completed studies at the Klement Gottwald Military Political Academy (VPA) in Bratislava and on 8 September 1958 he joined the ZS/GŠ ČSLA. In the years 1958–1960, he completed an intelligence course, from 6 April 1960 to 1967 he was successively the leading senior officer at the third, fourth, and second departments, from 8 December 1967 to 1971 he was a special military and aviation attaché (ZVLP) at the Czechoslovak embassy in Egypt (the ”Nil” residency), in the years 1971–1974, he headed the 3rd/2nd department for the Near East-Middle East and the Far East areas, in 1974 he completed a two-month intelligence course in the USSR. Afterwards, he was head of the 23rd department of the ZS/GŠ ČSLA from 1974 to 7 September 1982, 28 October 1982 to 1986 he was VLP and resident (452) [Residentura]–ROPA legalised as embassy counsellor at the Czechoslovak embassy in Libya. He took old-age retirement on 31 December 1986.
\textsuperscript{19} Colonel Premysl Kšaš, born: 29 September 1928, on 8 September 1958 he joined the ZS/GŠ. From 8 September 1958 to 31 August 1959 he completed studies at the Intelligence Institute, from 1 September 1959 to 12 October 1961 he was an officer at the second department, from 13 October 1961 to 20 April 1965 he was deputy military and aviation attaché (ZVLP) at the Czechoslovak embassy in France, from 20 April 1965 to 20 July 1970, he was a senior officer at the second department, from 20 July (21 August) 1970 to 14 November 1975, he was VLP in Algeria, from 14 November 1975 to 1 February 1978, he was a senior officer at the 23rd department, from 1 February 1978 to 8 September 1982, he was head of the first group of the 23rd department and from 8 September 1982 to 30 November 1987, he was head of the 23rd department of the ZS/GŠ. He retired on 31 January 1988.
\textsuperscript{21} Lieutenant Colonel Čech’s successors in the role of steering group (ŠG) officer for special tasks was Lieutenant Colonel Emil Kratochvíl, born: 16 August 1935, who was stationed in Tripoli from 20 April 1983 to 18 February 1987, and subsequently from 19 January 1987 to 10 August 1989. Lieutenant Colonel Oto Kozlík, born: 30 July 1949, identified in internal HS VKR documents as R-MARTIN; after the cancellation of the legalising post, his role was meant to have been taken over by the residency’s rank-and-file body Major Cyril Halama.
\textsuperscript{22} Initially the foreign station of the First Directorate of the National Security Corps (SNB) in Tripoli contained only one officer of the 50th department, who besides ciphering services also, of course, dealt with security issues at the embassy. Cf. e.g. ABS, f. ZS/GŠ, a. č. 38869. Personal file 589 II. Report on the activity of the residency for the year 1980, 31 October 1980, č. j. 0052/80.
Counterintelligence versus intelligence

The policy of divisions of State Security – including the Third Directorate of the National Security Corps – toward the Czechoslovak military contingent in Libya as well as the ZS/GŠ ČSLA as one of the few intelligence organisations operating under the communist totalitarian regime outside of the security apparatus subordinate to the Federal Ministry of the Interior was based on applicable internal standards.

According to the organisation rules of the Main Military Counterintelligence Directorate, its First Department (the department for the Federal Ministry of National Defence (FMNO) and the General Staff of the Czechoslovak People’s Army) organised and implemented counterintelligence activity focused on so-called state security protection of the Federal Ministry of National Defence, the General Staff of the Czechoslovak People’s Army and earmarked army security divisions and facilities, which, among other things, amounted to participating in cooperation with the Main Directorate (First Directorate of the National Security Corps, i.e. I. S-SNB), the Counterintelligence Directorate for Fighting against the External Enemy (Second Directorate of the National Security Corps, i.e. II. S-SNB), and, if need be, other divisions of State Security for the state security protection of officers from the FMNO before their inclusion at a workplace abroad.24

The Second Department (the department for the management and coordination) of the Main Military Counterintelligence Directorate thus ensured the counterintelligence protection of soldiers on active service and civilian workers from the Czechoslovak armed forces who were travelling abroad within the framework of assistance for developing countries (i.e. directly within the sphere of interest).25 By order of the head of the Third Directorate of the National Security Corps, the management of the organisational units of the Main Directorate of Military Counterintelligence as well as subordinate units of divisions of Military Counterintelligence (VKR) was adjusted as of 1 May 1981. The head of the directorate, Brigadier General Pavol Vrlík26 left the First Section in direct control and his first deputy Colonel Miroslav Voll27 continued to manage the Second Section. Besides this, the order stated that the counterintelligence protection of the ZS/GŠ ČSLA, as a specific part of the Czechoslovak People’s Army fulfilling the task of reconnaissance intelligence, would secure the First Department of the Third Directorate of the National Security Corps.28

Its Third Department, directed by the older specialist management officer Colonel Milan Peml,29 obtained and managed an agent-secret agent network in the ranks of military intelligence officers. Over the years, this gradually created a complex web of relationships, where State Security agents and secret agents operated at individual ZS/GŠ ČSLA workplaces and handed over information concerning their colleagues and the actions they had started to the First Department of the Main Military Counterintelligence Directorate. These secret exponents of the Third Directorate of the National Security Corps were also active in foreign residencies of the ZS/GŠ, sometimes also in military and aviation attached posts, where they were even sometimes managed in the field by officers of the 26th department (the foreign counterintelligence department) of the First Directorate of the National Security Corps.

The effort to ensure the widest control of ZS/GŠ ČSLA officers and their activities on the part of State Security and the leadership of the Federal Ministry of the Interior – probably a kind of local equivalent of the competitive battle between the State Security Committee of the USSR (KGB) and the Main Counterintelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR (GRU) – is also reflected in the content of dozens of edited documents, which were created primarily at the Third Department of the First Section (the FMNO and GŠ section) of the Main Military Counterintelligence Directorate.

Besides the operational interest that this specialised workplace of the Third Directorate of the National Security Corps had in the running of the “Oil” residency, which is documented by several documents in the relevant part of the subject sub-file, which for reasons of space could not be edited, six of the presented documents demonstrate the method of obtaining interesting information from Libya pertaining to the activity and support of terrorist groups, particularly the Abu Nidal’s organisation.

In this context, it is necessary to state that secret facts from the field of military reconnaissance intelligence was leaked to State Security via secret agents and informants, including specific data on the obtaining of collaborators from the ranks of Czechoslovak military personnel or ascertainment agents.

29 Colonel Milan Peml, born: 20 June 1936, leading senior specialist officer (VSRS) third division of the first department of HS VKR from 1 September 1976, on 1 November 1988 appointed VSRS of the third division of the VKR department of the Federal Ministry of National Defence (FMNO) and the GŠ ČSLA.
cy activity in Tripoli. Moreover, hand-written notes by officials of the Third Directorate of the National Security Corps indicate that the concealment of sources and the subsequent camouflaging of this “stolen” information was not an easy matter.

For the sake of completeness, it is necessary to add that the extraordinary relations of military counterintelligence and military reconnaissance intelligence, which was primarily down to the powerful position of State Security and the Federal Ministry of the Interior, could not be changed, not even immediately after the collapse of the communist regime. This issue was not definitively resolved in the Czech Republic until 2005 in connection with the establishment of a unified Military Intelligence entity.

Document No. 1
1986, 11 March – Prague. Record of the senior official specialist of the Third Department of the First Section of the Third Directorate of the National Security Corps Lieutenant Colonel Václav Vrkoč30 “The establishment of a command in Libya – report” No. 1/86, written out after a meeting with the collaborator “Marko.”31

1. The Libyan news agency JANA announced that the General People’s Congress, which is the supreme executive and legislative institution on Libya, adopted a resolution at the start of March 1986. According to this resolution, new suicide commando units will be created, which will hit American and Zionist interests with attacks at any location. The resolution calls for attacks against American and Israeli consulates in the Arab world and for the persecution of secret and public organisations of the global Zionist movement.

The Libyan parliament also called for the creation of military training camps with various types of weapons for all Arabs in Libya.

2. The creation of commando units in Libya against American and Zionist interests.

3. – 0 –

4. I recommend informing the head of the First Section32 and the head of the Main Directorate of Military Counterintelligence (HS VKR).

5. – 0 –

6. – 0 –

[…33

Senior specialist officer

Lieutenant Colonel Václav VRKOČ

[The information has passed through the AIPO[analytical informational and planning department] – either MONITORS or the press. Peml]34


30 Lieutenant Colonel Václav Vrkoč, born: 1 April 1931, on 29 August 1953 he was reassigned to the Sixth Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior (HS VKR), from 1 February 1981 he was a senior specialist officer (SRS) of the Third Division of the ZS GŠ’s first department and from 1 November 1988 the third division of the VKR FMNO and GŠ ČSLA III. S-NB. As of 1 June 1990 within the framework of the HS VKR he was transferred to the department of the FMNO. See: http://www. ustrcz.cz/data/pdf/karty/sprava3-1989/142925.pdf

31 According to the registration record of the personal files of secret agents of the first department of the Third Directorate of the National Security Corps, file D “Marko,” registration number (hereinafter only referred to as r. č.) 3767 was opened on 21 March 1980. Colonel Zdeněk Marek, born: 17 February 1936, joined the ZŠ/GŠ on 4 January 1971, he was later a senior officer of the first (document) group of the third department, from 1979 he was head of the first group of the third department. Cf. ABS, I. HS VKR, a. č. A 64501.

32 The head of the first section of the Third Directorate of the National Security Corps from 1 December 1979 was Colonel Ján Nagy, who was appointed head of the VKR FMNO and GŠ ČSLA on 1 November 1988.

33 Handwritten signature: Lt. Col. Vrkoč.

34 Handwritten note by Colonel Peml.
1. The source informed about a report that was sent from TRIPOLI. The following is stated in the report: On 2 March 1988, he informed about data on the preparation of terrorist groups abroad with Libyan participation. A group operating in Istanbul is mainly managed from the Libyan bureau in Belgrade and despite the fact that it is presented as a group of ABU NIDAL, it is composed solely of Libyans.

The source stated that his head office confirmed its activation and the beginning of recruitment among Turkish Kurds. The following Libyan nationals were identified as members of this group:

- the engineer Mohamed Ali Ahmed ALBASI, born in Dzanzoor in 1952, passport C 113704
- the teacher Mohamed Musfa Al DIN TAHR, born in Al Zavia in 1943, passport 653168.

The appearance of these people in the countries of the social[s]ist camp cannot be ruled out, and the CSSR is no exception.

2. Information on terrorist groups abroad and their possible trips to the CSSR.

3. The report has been filed with the ZS/GŠ.

---

35 Major – from 1 March 1989, Lieutenant Colonel – Josef Bukáček, born: 28 August 1950, on 1 December 1976 he was reassigned to the HS VKR. On 1 August 1983 he became a senior officer of the third department of the first section, on 1 November 1988 he was then senior specialist officer of the third department of the FMNO and GS ČSLA section of the National Security Corps. As of 1 June 1990 within the framework of the National Security Corps. As of 1 June 1990 within the framework of the FMNO, he was re-assigned to the department of FMNO. See: http://www.uscbr.cz/data/pdf/karty/sprava3-1989/168897.pdf. He was the managing entity for the secret collaborator (TS) “Mikulák” from 12 December 1984 to the beginning of 1990. ABOS, E. HS VKR, a. č. A 66454. Record No. 15/84 “Handing over the TS [secret collaborator] MIKULÁK to a new OP [operative worker] for further management.”, 13 December 1984; Evaluation of collaboration with the TS “MIKULÁK” č. j. 05 719 for the year 1989, 22 January 1990.

36 According to the registration record of the personal files of secret agents, D “Muzikant,” r. č. 18760, was initiated in 8 August 1985, Alexandre Hirmst, born: 28 February 1948, was an officer of ZS/GŠ ČSLA from 1 October 1970, in the years 1971-1972 he completed studies at the Intelligence Institute, in 1972 he was an officer of the agents division, from 14 October 1974 to 4 February 1978 he was VLP secretary at the Czechoslovak embassy in Damascus, where he has the “hallmark” of being a zealous executor of all the tasks assigned to him.

Conclusion: The report is credible. In view of the arrival of ABU SALIN in Prague, it is not possible to rule out an effort by ABU NIDAL to ascertain the conditions for using his students in the CSSR for involvement in a conspiratorial network arranging terrorist attacks against the countries of Western Europe. SALINA’s departure was handled via the embassy in Damascus.

2. Information on terrorist groups abroad and their possible trips to the CSSR.

3. The report has been filed with the ZS/GŠ.
4. Measures:
– transfer the information by file to the II. S-SNB Fifth Section
– don’t carry out any more measures
5. Personal data: this will not be stipulated.


Document No. 3
1989, 30 March – Prague. Record from a senior specialist officer of the Third Department of the FMNO Section and the General Staff of the Third Directorate of the National Security Corps Lieutenant Colonel Josef Bukáček No. 2/89 “Possible terrorist actions towards the embassies of the Hungarian People’s Republic abroad – report,” written down after a meeting with the secret collaborator “Marcela”

[...]
1. [By way of a ZS/GŠ agent resource it was ascertained that] Colonel GADDAFI issued an order to restrict overt support for Palestinian terrorist groups in the ZP [area of interest]. The process of cooling relations with the MLR [Hungarian People’s Republic] is continuing. On 23 March 1989, a Hungarian delegation for industrial cooperation travelled from the ZP. It was not received by the leadership in the ZP. GADDAFI silently accepted a declaration by Palestine’s terrorist groups whereby the MLR was warned: “If you, the government of the MLR, will continue in normalising relations with Israel and the traitor ARAFAT, we shall carry out acts of individual terror against workers with foreign embassies of the MLR.” This has been put into the context of the disappearance of a Hungarian doctor as of 19 March (of Jewish ethnicity, accused of actively working in the ZP for MOSSAD).

2. Possible terrorist actions against the embassies of the MLR abroad.
3. The report has been filed with the ZS/GŠ.
4. Measures:
– information authenticated via the Nsk [group leader] and the NOdd [department head].
– pass on the information to our Hungarian friends [for the daily situation report (DSZ) and recommend the inf. of Hungarian friends.

Fuřílek Bukáček
Comrade CHYLÍK sent Peml]

5. Personal data: this will not be stipulated.
6. The information was obtained by way of an A/P [agent source] of the ZS/GŠ ČSLA. The A/P has been evaluated as reliable by the ZS/GŠ. In view of the conspiracy of the ZS/GŠ source, I recommend that a limited group of people be acquainted with the information.

[I agree with the measure
Col. Peml 30 March 1989]


According to the appended document a “foreign source” was exploited once more, and, at the same time, the names of not two but three members of the Abu Nidal terrorist group were specified: the engineer Mohamed Ali Ahmed Al-BASI, born: 1952 in Janzur, Libya, Mohamed Mustafa Al-FIM, born: 1947 in Az Zahrah, Libya, and the machine mechanic Nazim Ad Din TAHR, born: 1943 in Az Zawiah, Libya.

The meeting took place on 29 March 1989. According to an entry in the registration record for the files of secret collaborators of the First Section of the Third Directorate of the National Security Corps, the file of the secret agent was first opened on 30 November 1978. It was transferred on 22 November 1979 to a TS personal file with the codename “Marcela,” č. j. 740. Major Jiří Hamerník, born: 7 January 1952, a member of the 23rd division of the ZS/GŠ, from 1983 the VLP office at the Czechoslovak embassy in Egypt, 1987 senior managing officer of the First Group of the 23rd division. Cf. ABS, f. HS VKR, a. č. A 61573. Record of the vetting of an agent, 10 July 1984.

According to the distribution list, copy No. 1 was placed in the TS file and copy No. 2 was placed in the OBS (subject file) R-Libye.

Add hand.
21. 8. 1989 D – BOUDA\textsuperscript{55}
. KR has a standard attitude to all white people
. GADDAFI declared that every white person is a spy and is in the ZP for the purpose of chafing Libya
. as of 1 July 1989 he halted all assistance for terrorist groups
. he will continue helping and supporting but financial resources will be supplied by his intermediaries in order to avoid theft,
. FOLTÝN – without State Security (StB) knowledge, good work, but lazy
. BOČEK\textsuperscript{56} – no negative information thus far. Bukáček\textsuperscript{57}


\textsuperscript{55} According to the registration record for the files of secret agents of the First Section of the HS VKR, file D “Bouda,” č. j. 1158, was opened on 5 February 1979. After working for a time in Delhi, he was managed as the secret collaborator RAJAN by members of the First Directorate of the National Security Corps. Cf. ABS, f. HS VKR, a. č. A-64453. Lieutenant Colonel Vratislav Budař, born: 5 July 1946, after attending the Klement Gottwald Military Political Academy he came to the ZS/GŠ in 1975. In the years, 1976-1977, he completed studies at the Intelligence Institute. From 13 January 1979 until 1982 ZVLP at the embassy in India, 1983-1987 – senior officer at the 23rd department, 1986-1990 VLP in Tripoli.

\textsuperscript{56} Major Milošlav Boček, born: 8 November 1952, a member of the 24th department of the ZS/GŠ ČSLA.

\textsuperscript{57} Added by hand.
1. The source gave information about a report that was sent from TRIPOLI. In the report it states: On 29 June 1989, the ZS/GŠ agent source let it be known that organisational changes had occurred through which the Libya leader Gaddafi wants to free Libya from its hitherto publicly known support for terror and PLO groups (PLO = Palestine Liberation Organisation), prepared in Libya. After the conclusion of negotiations with ABDULLA HIJAZI (authorised by the leadership of the section for helping the PLO) the Libya leader GADDAFI is pursuing organisational measures to get rid of profane forms of support for international terrorism, which has been called a progressive revolutionary movement by the Libya leadership. A decision was adopted to transfer the centre of support for these organisations to CYPRUS, under the company “GOLDEN BEEN” in Nicosia with full financial support from Libya. The emphasis of the company “GOLDEN BEEN” will be on:
- obtaining information on military intelligence issues
- purchasing special technology for equipping terrorist groups (5-10 members) with a strict conspiratorial connection to other cells in Libya
- organisationally securing central actions.

Why was this decision taken by GADDAFI?:
- GADDAFI is aware of the need to move away from hitherto demonstrative support, including the suppression of personal ties with ABU NIDAL and ABU MOUSSA. It also enforces the trend of reconciliation with Arab countries. He has no intention of getting rid of the influence of these organisations and carrying out organisational and material measures for the possibility of manipulating them further for the benefit of his policies. He considers this means of “cover” to be ideal for managing the “black market,” which should still continue to materially provide terrorist groups with special technology.

2. Information on terrorist groups in Libya.

3. The report has been filed with the ZS/GŠ.

4. Measures:
- inform the First Deputy Federal Minister of the Interior, the First and Second Directorate of the National Security Corps.

5. Personal data: this will not be stipulated.

6. The report can be considered to be reliable in view of the character of the collaborator BOUDA, who was tasked with obtaining information from the ZP on international terrorist groups.

[I agree Colonel Peml 11 July 1989]


---

58 According to the distribution list, copy No. 1 was placed in the TS file, copy No. 2 in the OBS R-Libye file, and copy No. 3 in D-BOUDA materials.
60 Cf. RUBIN, Barry: Revolution until Victory? The Politics and History of the PLO, p. 129.
61 Concerning Abu Moussa, real name Sajeed Moussa Muragha, see ibid., pp. 62-64.
62 Major General Alojz Lorenc was First Deputy Minister of the Interior of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic from 1 November 1985 to 21 December 1989.
63 The Main Intelligence Directorate (First Directorate of the National Security Corps) and the Main Counterintelligence Directorate (Second Directorate of the National Security Corps).
64 Handwritten signature: Bukáček.
65 Added by hand.
Document No. 5
1989, 22 September – Prague. Record from a senior specialist officer of the Third Department of the FMNO Section and the General Staff of the Third Directorate of the National Security Corps Lieutenant Colonel Josef Bukáček No. 8/89 “Information on the titular head of the PLO (FATAH) in the CSSR – report”, written down after a meeting with the secret collaborator “Marcela”

[...] 66
1. The source gave information about a report that was sent by the VLP from TRIPOLI on 22 September 1989. In the report it states: The characteristics of the PLO (FATAH) envoy in the CSSR:

A.

On 19 September 1989, the agent source gave substantial information on the personality of ABU HISAM, the current envoy in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. The progressive leadership of the PLO have been called exponents of rightwing thinking, devoid of efforts to achieve the principled solution of establishing an independent Palestinian state. 67 With the knowledge of FATAH, his policy of personal enrichment is tolerated. He is ARAFAT’s closest collaborator and he diverts “tithes” to him for illegal smuggling and enrichment activities carried out in Prague. He exploits knowledge of the FATAH leadership – foreign relations section to manipulate people visiting the Palestine consular office in Prague and he entrusts them with tasks connected with defending the positions of the ARAFAT leadership in the CSSR.

B.

The former VV [envoy] (PLO representative) in Prague ATIF ABU BAKR (replaced in 1985), who subsequently switched to the ABU NIDAL group, conducted negotiations with the leadership of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFOP) 68 on 2 September 1989, where he explained the reason for the split with NIDAL. The stance of the DFOP leadership is as follows: This is a person with a close relationship with the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and an interest in returning to Prague in a private capacity to finish his studies. He is willing to provide valuable information on the conclusions of ultra-left[wing] Palestinian (terror) groups, and to use close acquaintances in FATAH’s Central Committee (with FARUH KHADUMI, ABU JJAD SALAH KHALAF 69 and ABU AL HOOF 70) to reveal the operations of terrorist groups in the ZSS [the countries of socialist community] aimed at West[ern] countries. His wife and daughter have been in TRIPOLI up to now, for safe[ty] reasons, he’s considering moving them to the CSSR.

Conclusion:
In view of the information that has been passed on, I request an opinion on the possible provision of assistance during regular immigration clearance for ABU BAKR or clarification concerning the aforementioned persons.

As regards HISAM, I request that discretion be observed. He is a dang[erous] member of the FATAH leadership, who has been entrusted with disinformation activities concerning the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the government of the CSSR. One cannot rule out the use of a network of Palestinians in the CSSR, including people of Czechoslovak nationality. He is fully covered by dipl[omatic] immunity.

2. Negative information on the activity of the PLO envoy in the CSSR.

3. The report has been filed with the ZS/GŠ.

4. Measures:
   - use for DSZ 71
   - inform the Second S-SNB about the adoption of separate measures

5. Personal data: this will not be stipulated.

6. In the event that the report is used, take cognisance of the conspiracy of the ZS/GŠ ČSLA source.

Senior specialist officer
Lt. Col. Josef Bukáček [...] 72


66 There were handwritten notes on the back page of the record: - the ZS/GŠ will not use, except for its own analysis – cooperation is possible if our source will have further possibilities to clarify – they are asking us for an evaluation of the report that was the source intended for VKR. LOOK OUT for conspiracy. Only for a decision by the management of officers of the Second Directorate of the National Security Corps or the Federal Ministry of the Interior. 22 September 1989 Colonel Peml. On 25 September 1989, the head of the First Section of the Third Directorate of the National Security Corps, Colonel Nagy added: – this concerns a report that was sent to the ZS/GŠ headquarters from Tripoli [Libya] by the VLP CSSR, – the management of the ZS/GŠ will make no further use of this information – the report is intended directly for the VKR with a request for an evaluation, – I propose informing Comrade NFMV [Deputy Federal Minister of the Interior] and also informing the Second Directorate of the National Security Corps. In the header, a brief opinion was written by the deputy head of the Third Directorate of the National Security Corps, Colonel Jaroslav Bendák: Comrade Nagy – make an excerpt for information for the Second Directorate of the National Security Corps, – the first deputy has been informed, – used for daily information in accordance with the instructions of the secretariat of the First Deputy of the Federal Ministry of the Interior Brigadier General Ing. Alois Lorenz. According to the distribution list, copy No. 1 was placed in the TS work file, copy No. 2 was placed in D-BOUDA materials, and copy No. 3 was placed in OBS R-Lybie.


68 Al-Jabha al-Dimuqratijja li-Tahrir Filastin, in English: the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFOP).

69 and ABU AL HOOL

70 To reveal the operations of terrorist groups in the ZSS [the countries of socialist community] aimed at West[ern] countries. His wife and daughter have been in TRIPOLI up to now, for safe[ty] reasons, he’s considering moving them to the CSSR.

71 The agent record was probably processed in the information flow as a daily situation report (DSZ) of the Third Directorate of the National Security Corps and not a DSZ of the internal and organisational directorate (VOS) of the FMV. Cf. http://www.usstrcr.cz/cs/denni-situacni-zpravy-1989#zari (cited on 30 August 2013).

72 Handwritten signature: Bukáček.
Document No. 6
1989, 9 November – Prague. Record from a senior specialist officer of the Third Department of the FMNO Section and the General Staff of the Third Directorate of the National Security Corps Lieutenant Colonel Josef Bukáček No. 10/89 “The Libya leadership’s relationship with ABU NIDAL’s movement– report,” written down after a meeting with the secret collaborator “Marcela”

 meta number1
1. The source gave information about a report that was sent by the Czechoslovak VLP from TRIPOLI. In the report it states: On 31 October 1989, the source confirmed the split in ABU NIDAL’s organisation. On 24 October 1989, GADDAFI was given a statement calling for him to give up supporting ABU NIDAL’s organisation. This statement had been formulated by four members of this organisation’s politburo. The document states that by October 1987, when NIDAL went to reside permanently in Libya, he had 156 members of this organisation murdered. This liquidation was carried out at the training centre in YAFRAN, which has been partly converted into a concentration camp at present. The liquidation of a further 106 people also occurred in Lebanon. The statement calls on GADDAFI to enter into negotiations immediately because otherwise the document will be published abroad and Libya will be identified as a participant in these actions. GADDAFI will be forced to deal comprehensively with the situation, notwithstanding the fact that NIDAL is one of his favourites. There is also the option of physically disposing of NIDAL as an inconvenient witness of support for the terrorist movement. NIDAL is threatening to publicly disclose actions that he carried out at the express wishes of Libya (the liquidation of inconvenient Libyan people outside of Libya).

73 According to the distribution list, copy No. 1 of record No. 10/89 was placed in the TS work file, copy No. 2 was placed in D-BOUDA materials, and copy No. 3 was placed in OBS R-Lybie.

behind the iron curtain 149
The opposition to NIDAL has been concentrated in the PDRA [the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria] since September 1989. His opponents include - ABU BAKR, ABDELAH ISSA, MUNIR AHMED and MOHAMED ALI, a former collaborator of ABU NIZAR, who was murdered by NIDAL previously.

NIDAL has not been detected in TRIPOLI in the past 14 days. It cannot be ruled out that he is staying in the CSSR, were he had previously operated for a long time and appealed to a number of friends “in high places in Czechoslovakia.” The Palestine KR is carrying out measures to secure him. The possibility that he is staying in France and Italy has been examined.

Conclusion:
It is possible to expect that some actions from the Libya leadership’s to liquidate NIDAL’s “insubordination.” The main aim of these actions will be to prevent an international scandal being on GADDAFI’s hands. From this perspective, it is also not possible to rule out his physical liquidation.

2. The situation surrounding ABU NIDAL’s organisation.

The report has been filed with the ZS/GŠ.

4. Measures:
- use for DSZ
- inform the Second Directorate of the National Security Corps of the adoption of separate measures
- the report has been transferred to the IU [information centre?]
- the report has been authenticated by way of the head of the 23rd Department and at the same time he is requesting its evaluation.

5. Personal data: this will not be stipulated.

6. In the event that the report is used, take cognisance of the conspiracy of the ZS/GŠ ČSLA source.

Senior specialist officer
Lt. Col. Josef Bukáček […]

74 The agent record was probably processed in the information flow as a DSZ of the Third Directorate of the National Security Corps and not a DSZ of the VOS of the FMV. Cf. http://www.ustrcr.cz/cs/denni-situacni-zpravy-1989#listopad (cited on 30 August 2011).
75 Handwritten signature: Bukáček.
76 Additionally written by hand.
VÝHODNOCENÍ
činnosti rezidentury ZS/GŠ v záj.prostoru LIBYE

Rezidentura ZS/GŠ v Libyi je od svého založení v převážné míře obsazována pracovníky ZS/GŠ v legalizačních funkcích, ve většině případů za FMZV. Toto je dán specificky podmínkami daného ZP. Rezidentura je umístěna na čs.ZÚ v Tripoli.

Z hlediska kontrarozvědné činnosti byla zde nejvíce podchycena činnost NKR ve směru k našim pracovníkům a to hlavně:
- sledování, provádění odposlechů a prověrky přítomnosti orgánů v místě bydliště za pomocí tел.апаратů.

Po dobú zařazení našich příslušníků v daném prostoru nebyla ze strany NKR provedena žádná provokace nebo snaha o kompromitaci.

V současné době jsou na rezidentuře v Tripoli zařazeni dva příslušníci ZS/GŠ. Jejich ochrana na zahraničním pracovišti je zabezpečována pracovníky I.správy SNB. K osobě plk.HA-TAŠE ani npor.ZOUHARA nebylo získáno negativních poznatků.

Pracovníci plní v prostoru úkoly v náborové i informační činnosti v oblasti Středního východu.

Uvedená rezidentura je řízena 1.skupinou 23.oddělení ZS/GŠ HÚ v Praze a jejím řídícím orgánem je: ....................

Operativní situace byla zpracována ke dni 21.10.1983 a bude doplňována podle potřeby a vzniklé situací na rezidentuře.